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ABSTRACT
On Monday, March 12 at 14:30 UTC, 2018, the sounding
rocket REXUS 24 was launched from Esrange Space
Center. After T+8.9 s, the payload separated unintention-
ally from the motor. The payload impacted 2 km north
east of the launcher. The thrusting motor continued to
fly down range. All objects were contained within safe
areas, causing no damage on human beings or property.
The methodical approach of the conducted failure inves-
tigation is introduced and the most probable failure cause
is identified. A summary of performed studies is given
and it is described how the most probable failure cause
was deduced. Finally, recommendations and restrictions
referring technical and procedural aspects are covered
which are planned to be applied in future campaigns.
Key words: failure investigation; sounding rocket;
REXUS.
1. INTRODUCTION
After the launch of REXUS 24, it was unclear if the fail-
ure was caused by a non-nominal performance of the
used standard systems or by one of the experiments.
Therefore, and until the root cause was found, the fail-
ure entailed a grounding of further REXUS rockets such
as REXUS 23 which should have launched within the
same campaign. The failure investigation followed an ap-
proach which is known as root cause analysis and which
is widely used in many science and engineering disci-
plines [1]. Unlike treating symptoms, an effective prob-
lem solving process focuses on uncovering and removing
the failure’s root cause. If it is not properly corrected,
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Figure 1: REXUS 24 vehicle configuration. From [2].
the same problem may reappear or even spread to other
areas. From an organizational point of view, an open fail-
ure culture is desirable, so that failures can be discussed
openly and generate knowledge.
2. REXUS 24 VEHICLE
The vehicle configuration for the REXUS 24 mission is
shown in Fig. 1. For the REXUS program, the unguided
solid propellant single stage Improved Orion motor from
military surplus is used. Technically, the motor assem-
bly comprises the actual Improved Orion rocket motor,
the tail can, three fins, the launch lug and the motor
adapter including the yo-yo despin system and the man-
acle ring. Forward of the motor assembly, there are at-
tached the payload support systems, namely the Recov-
ery Module and the Service Module (SM). Above these
systems, there were arranged the modules of the experi-
ments MORE, ROACH and WOLF. The two experiments
PIOneERS and BlackBox were directly located under the
nosecone.
3. METHODICAL APPROACH
Immediately after the failed launch of REXUS 24, Es-
range Space Center and DLR MORABA established a
Failure Investigation Board (FIB) with members from
SSC, MORABA and ZARM. The main objectives of the
FIB were:
• Leading the failure analysis process
• Reporting to agencies
• Reporting to third parties
• Interface to experts
• Management of resources
• Preparing failure report
• Deducing of lessons learned and recommendations
The failure investigation was structured into several top-
ics and task forces. Topics group vehicle systems or prop-
erties whereas task forces are working groups for specific
methods and tasks of the investigation. The participants
of the working groups involved FIB members and ex-
perts from SSC, ZARM and DLR. For each topic and
task force, one representative was assigned. This struc-
ture provided a clear baseline and clear responsibilities
throughout the investigation which ultimately conveyed
its successful outcome.
3.1. Topics
For the REXUS 24 investigation, following topics have
been identified:
• Scientific Payload: This topic included the recovery
and investigation of the REXUS 24 payload. More-
over, interviews with the experiment teams have
been prepared and conducted.
• Motor: A focus of this topic was the search for the
rocket motor which separated from the payload dur-
ing flight and could not localized. Regardless of be-
ing able to examine the physical hardware, possible
failure scenarios of the rocket motor were studied
and qualitatively assessed using existing flight data.
• Rocket Systems: This topic comprised the investi-
gation of the Service Module, the Recovery System
and the Separation System.
• Vehicle Dynamics: This topic focused on analyses
of the dynamic behavior of the rocket vehicle.
3.2. Task forces
In the beginning of the investigation, securing of avail-
able data was most relevant. For REXUS 24, two task
forces have been established reflecting the importance of
this effort:
• Data: This involved the maintenance and security of
the data repository of the failure investigation across
the participating organizations.
• Media: Plenty of image, video and audio footage
was recorded both, from inside the scientific payload
and from outside during launch. Furthermore, the
rocket launch was visually observed by many par-
ticipants of the REXUS program. Main tasks were
the collection, the ordering and the synchronization
of the manifold and diverse sources.
Timeline A common method of root cause analyses is
the composition of a timeline including both, nominal
and non-nominal events. A major work related to the
timeline became the synchronization of the various data
sources. This was necessary since it was critical to deter-
mine the correct sequence of events recorded by different
systems. In particular around T+3.6 s, several events rel-
evant for this investigation occurred within a short time
interval. In order to be able to determine which event
occurred before the other, an accuracy of around 20ms
was required. For this investigation, a Corrected Time-
line (CTL) was introduced which defined T + 0 s as the
moment of the first detected motion of the vehicle (lift-
off) and which achieved the required accuracy across the
different data sources.
Failure Tree A failure tree was used as a method for
deductive top-down failure analysis. Beginning with
the top-event (premature payload impact), various failure
branches and nodes are determined. For each node, the
likelihood of occurrence is qualitatively assessed. Typ-
ically, an increasing number of branches are developed
towards the bottom of the failure tree. Finally, nodes are
determined which cannot be further broken down. This
leads to the (multiple) root cause(s).
Figure 2: Upper part of the developed failure tree for
REXUS 24. Circles denote nodes which cannot broken
down any further. Rectangles denote nodes with sub-
branches which are linked to the parent element with a
logical OR. The colors have following meanings:
Green: Did NOT occur
Red: Occurred
Yellow: Cannot be excluded
4. FINDINGS
Out from the defined topics and task forces, several find-
ings have been identified which have been considered
as most relevant for this investigation. In the following,
these findings are presented and discussed.
4.1. Media
The media footage taken from inside the rocket payload
as well as from outside during launch have been ana-
lyzed. The two video cameras of experiment ROACH
detected a noticeable “bang” sound and a visible me-
chanical shock around T+3.56 s (CTL). From this time
onwards, the sound changed to a whistling noise and re-
peating light reflections were visible in the compartment
as shown in Fig. 3. At T+6.20 s, a second small “bang”
and mechanical shock was detected by these cameras and
from T+6.741 s onwards, a repeating red light reflection
was seen in the compartment. Around T+8.8 s, a large
shock and “bang” occurred. Subsequently, the amount of
light flooding the module increased significantly, debris
and damages were visible in the ROACH compartment.
An analysis of a video taken from the Radar hill – ap-
proximately at a distance of 2.4 km from the launch site
Figure 3: ROACH payload video. T+4.406 s. Frame
showing bright light reflection pattern indicated by the
white circle.
Figure 4: Magnified video frames taken from Radar hill
(Team ROACH). Arrows indicate observed debris. The
accuracy of the given times is limited by the video frame
rate (30 FPS).
– revealed an object falling next to the rocket vehicle
around T+3.6 s (see Fig. 4). This event occurred at that
time when the first “bang” and mechanical shock in the
experiment module ROACH were recorded.
4.2. Scientific Payload
Several findings associated with the FFU retention /
ejection mechanism of experiment WOLF have been
observed. For a further study, it is important to under-
stand the design of the ejection mechanism. As shown in
Fig. 5, two Free Falling Units (FFUs) were planned to be
ejected in radial directions. In order to benefit most from
the available space, the two FFUs are accommodated on
top of each other. The ejection system relies on both,
the centrifugal forces of the spinning rocket vehicle and
Figure 5: Side view of WOLF module with FFUs and
hatches. From [3].
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Figure 6: WOLF ejection system. The cable of the up-
per ejection mechanism is indicated by a red thick line,
whereas the cable of the lower ejection mechanism is in-
dicated by a dashed red line. The mounting positions
of the tensioning cables at the hooks are marked with
x. Adapted from [3].
the spring-energized pusher plates which are tensioned
during assembly and released at the pre-programmed
time. The module openings are covered with hatches
which are designed to be flush with the outer structure.
Part of the ejection mechanism displayed in Fig. 6 are
the pairs of hooks which prevent the hatches to move.
The hooks are restrained by 1mm thick steel cables that
are cut for ejection by a pyrotechnical cable cutter trig-
gered by the REXUS SM. The cables are fed through
small holes at the lever arms of the hooks (marked by
red crosses in Fig. 6). The cable ends at the hooks are
prepared as loops around a nut in order to provide a stop
in case of slipping. The loops are crimped according to
a procedure [3, 4]. Moreover, the cable ends are attached
to the hooks with zip ties through the nuts as depicted in
Fig. 8. The cables are bent 90 deg between the hook and
the crimp. The other ends of the cables are fed through
the cable cutter and are clamped on a plate in the upper
part of the module.
Upon recovery of the payload, the two hatches and
FFUs of the WOLF module were seen to be missing.
Marks, scratches and damages around the openings and
inside the module suggested a non-nominal ejection with
Figure 7: Post-flight investigation of WOLF experiment
module. Witness marks and reconstructed positions of
hatch and FFU.
Figure 8: Sketch of possible slipping scenario of crimp
on hook.
an external force pressing the upper hatch against the
lower rim of the FFU bay. The possible positions of the
hatch and of the FFU before their detachments could
be reproduced with the recovered module and spare
hardware of hatch and FFU as shown in Fig. 7.
A drop in WOLF power consumption indicates that the
power umbilical of at least one FFU unit was discon-
nected around T+3.7 s. The assumption of a non-nominal
and premature opening of a hatch is also supported by the
repeating light reflections and audio changes recorded in
module ROACH – the module mounted directly below
WOLF – and by the video recordings from ground as
shown in Fig. 4.
The failure investigation found that one of the cable
crimps of the upper hatch was missing. It was determined
that this probably led to the release of the hatch tray as-
sembly. It was also demonstrated that a slipping of the
cable end compromises the pre-tension of the hook as de-
picted in Fig. 8. After the payload was recovered, one zip
tie (lower hatch), which was intended to hold the cable
end in place, was found broken in the module.
4.3. Motor
Valuable information had been expected from an inspec-
tion of the rocket motor. Therefore, several approaches
have been pursued to localize the motor hardware. These
involved impact analyses based on flight data available
until payload separation, 14 h of helicopter search within
the impact area, airborne surveys by the Swedish Coast
Guard, requests to facilities operating surveillance radars
and a search campaign with the satellites TerraSAR-X
and TanDEM-X which are instrumented with phased
array Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). Furthermore,
the tracking data and video footage of both telemetry
stations being operational during the REXUS 24 launch
have been analyzed and a reconstruction of the motor
trajectory after payload separation have been performed.
Unfortunately, none of these efforts resulted in the
localization of the rocket motor.
Despite not being able to examine the motor hardware,
the video footage of the telemetry station operated by
MORABA provided relevant indications of the nominal
functioning of the Improved Orion motor. By analyz-
ing the evolution of the exhaust plume and comparing it
to previous REXUS launches, a time range of the mo-
tor burnout was determined. Both, the minimum and
maximum time boundaries are within the nominal per-
formance range. Therefore, a burn through of the rocket
motor could be excluded.
4.4. Vehicle dynamics
The most noticeable anomalies seen in the flight data
were a discontinuity and steep increase of the roll rate at
T+3.6 s as shown in Fig. 9. At the same time, pronounced
spikes in the lateral rates have been detected. The time
resolution of the SM data is limited to 50ms.
Supporting Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Euler
analyses have been carried out by the DLR Institute of
Aerodynamics and Flow Technology. Three different
vehicle configurations and various inclination angles
have been studied: clean (nominal) configuration,
configuration with removed hatch and configuration with
partially opened hatch. Subsequently, the computed
forces and torques have been compared. However, none
of the studied configurations could explain the observed
discontinuities around T+3.6 s.
The investigation showed that a significant change in
aerodynamic properties of the vehicle can be the cause
Figure 9: Roll rate measured by SM. Within the high-
lighted time interval (T+3.55 s - T+3.60 s) which cannot
further resolved by SM data, the slope of the roll rate
changes significantly.
of the steep increase in the roll rate (Fig. 9) and the
changes in the lateral rates. The measured roll rate could
be reproduced in a simulation by assuming that the net
fin incidence angle of all fins is increased by 0.1 deg
from T+3.6 s onwards. A mechanism was reproduced
that appears to be able to cause such change: the impact
of a hatch on one of the Improved Orion fins.
In the framework of the failure investigation, impact
tests were performed together with the DLR Institute of
Structures and Design. Improved Orion fin structures
were used as target and reconstructed hatch assemblies
from the WOLF experiment setup were used as im-
pactors. The overall aim of the test series was to evaluate
potential effects of such impact. Although these tests did
not provide a conclusive proof for an impact, it can be
showed that such impacts cause serious (local) damages
which lead to geometry changes of the fin. A detailed
review of the test results is presented in [5].
The WOLF experiment carried its own Inertial Mea-
surement Unit (IMU) recording acceleration and angular
rates [6]. Apart from the measured roll rate and partly
due to the mounting of this sensor, the IMU data cannot
compared quantitatively to the corresponding SM data.
However, since the time resolution of this data is much
higher (1ms) than for SM data, this makes it highly
attractive for qualitative assessments for possible events
below the 50ms limit. Within the two data points
recorded by the SM at T+3.55 s and T+3.60 s, the
WOLF IMU measured two impulses with an oscillating
pattern which is observed in the acceleration along roll
axis plotted in Fig. 10 and also in the lateral angular rates.
The assumption of an impact is supported by the two
impulses recorded by the WOLF IMU. The first impulse
around T+3.55 s is possibly associated to the detachment
Figure 10: Acceleration along roll axis measured by
WOLF IMU.
of one of the hatches whereas the second impulse at
T+3.59 s is possibly caused by an impact of the hatch on
one of the fins. The derived event times are in line with
the evaluated times of the video analysis presented in
Fig. 4. Furthermore, a graphical analysis of the roll rate
slopes before T+3.55 s and after T+3.60 s independently
led to an event time which coincides with the second
impulse measured by the WOLF IMU and which is
interpreted as the impact of the hatch on one of the
fins. Furthermore, these times are in agreement with the
computed duration for a hatch transit between payload
compartment and fin leading edge.
Furthermore, two discrete reductions of acceleration
along roll axis (longitudinal direction) have been
recorded by the SM at T+5.5 s and T+6.2 s which are
possibly linked to an incremental overhanging of one
of the FFUs. This is supported by changes recorded in
the video footage of experiment ROACH at the latter
time, the found damage pattern within the WOLF com-
partment and further pictures taken from outside which
show an overhanging object next to the payload at times
≥ T + 6.5 s. Therefore, it is believed that the assumed
impact is associated to the hatch and not to the FFU.
5. MOST PROBABLE FAILURE CAUSE
The failure investigation determined that the most proba-
ble failure cause was linked to the premature ejection of
at least one FFU and the impact of its hatch on one of
the fins. Ultimately, the premature ejection of the FFU
was linked to a failure of the retention mechanism under
flight loads. The premature opening and detachment of
the hatch is supported by video footage recorded both, in-
side the payload and from outside. The observed changes
in the vehicle dynamics were most likely caused by an
impact of the hatch on one of the fins. This in turn led
to an aerodynamically instable flight configuration. Fi-
nally, excessive angles of attack led to excessive loads on
the manacle ring interface between the payload and the
motor resulting in a premature separation.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the failure was most probably caused by an
experiment module specific for REXUS 24 and no
non-nominal performance of any of the standard systems
could be determined, the failure does not require changes
in the general design or setup of systems in the REXUS
program. However, it is recommended to pay close
attention on the complexity level of the experiments. The
requirements must be adapted to the resources available
in the program.
In case of future experiment modules with in flight-
actuated hatches or FFUs, further guidelines have
been elaborated. These guidelines involve technical
recommendations and restrictions applied to the design
of hatches and frames, the retention system including
retention cables and cable ends, pyrotechnics as well
as the verification process. In addition, management
aspects and procedures have been revised in order to
regulate late design changes and flight preparation. The
updated guidelines can be found in the latest version of
the REXUS User Manual [7].
7. CONCLUSION
Using well established methods of the root cause anal-
ysis such as timeline and failure tree analysis, the FIB
identified the most probable failure cause of REXUS 24
which is linked to the premature ejection of at least one
FFU. The failure investigation was organized in vari-
ous topics and task forces, and the findings were as-
sessed in a structured way. Beyond determining the root
cause, recommendations for future experiments are out-
lined. The described failure investigation process to-
gether with the given recommendations might have the
potential to further improve and strengthen the overall
successful REXUS program.
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